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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH
CODEANN.(1996).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Issues.
Appellant Margaret Kilpatrick and her now deceased husband, James Kilpatrick,

filed a claim for personal injury and loss of consortium based on Mr. Kiipatrick's
asbestos-related disease. After Mr- Kilpatrick died, Mrs. Kilpatrick was substituted as
named plaintiff and amended her complaint to add actions for survival and wrongful
death in her capacity as representative of the legal heirs of James Kilpatrick. Defendants
moved to dismiss ail plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with the court's Case
Management Order No. L which requires an autopsy be conducted upon the death of any
plaintiff in an asbestos case. The court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs entire action
based on failure to conduct an autopsy on the body of James Kilpatrick raises the
following issues:
1. Did the court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error when it granted
the defendants' Motion to Dismiss as a discovery sanction without evidence of fault on
the part of the Plaintiffs?

1

2. Did the court commit reversible error in granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for failure to perform an autopsy when Appellants had other medical evidence to
support their claims?
B.

Standards of Review.
3.

Did the court commit reversible error when it denied the decedent's legal heirs

their right to a trial based on an alleged violation of a discovery order to which they were
not subject?
Whether the court properly granted the motion to dismiss is a question of law,
which the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the decision
of the court. Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, ^| 7, 42 P3d 1253.
Imposition of discovery sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tuck v.
Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, \ 15, 981 P.2d 407. The striking of pleadings, entering of
default, and rendering ofjudgment against a disobedient party are the most severe of the
potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a nonresponding party. Because of the
severity of this type of sanction, "the Trial Court's range of discretion is more narrow than
when the court is imposing less severe sanctions." Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508,
515 (Utah App., 1996). Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal to respond to a court order
compelling discovery is a harsh sanction and therefore, requires "a showing of
'willfulness, bad faith, or fault' on the part of the non-complying party/" First Federal
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984) (quoting
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Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U S . 197, 78 S.Ct 1087, 2 L.EcL2d 1255 (1958)).
"Willful failure7' has been defined as u 'any intentional failure as distinguished from
involuntary noncompliance, ""Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler 768 P.2d 950, 961 -962
(Utah App., 1989).
These issues were raised by the defendants in their motions to dismiss (R. 14971500; 1764-1769), the memoranda and other papers filed by the parties in support of and
in opposition to defendants^ motions (R. 1501-1602;1607-1615; 1770-1787; 1788-1792),
and at the hearing on the motion. (R. 1812).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
1. The Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11 is determinative of this issue and
provides as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
U.CA. 1953, Const Art. 1, § 11
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 is determinative of this issue and provides as
follows:
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RULE 37. FAILURE TO MAKE OR COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY;
SANCTIONS
=J= *

*

(b) Failure to comply with order.
# ^ *

(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, director,
or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to
testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including
an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an
order entered under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated
facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party;
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(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a
contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), such orders as are
listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to
comply is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the
party failing to obe}' the order or the attorney or both of them to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.
This case began as a claim for personal injury and loss of consortium resulting

from exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products. After the plaintiff died, his
spouse was substituted as the named plaintiff She amended her complaint to include
causes of action for survival and wrongful death on behalf of the heirs. The defendants
moved to dismiss the case based on violation of the courf s Case Management Order No.
1 which requires that in all asbestos cases, upon a plaintiffs death, his spouse or other
representative is required to produce the body for a full autopsy. At the time the
5

defendant's motion was filed, the plaintiff had been dead for over two years, no autopsy
had been conducted, and his body had been cremated.
The court determined that the failure to have an autopsy conducted was a violation
of the disco very provisions of its case management order and required dismissal of
plaintiffs claims. The court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against the
moving defendant. A subsequent motion put forth by additional defendants on the same
grounds was decided based on the court's prior memorandum decision, and the plaintiffs'
claims against those defendants were also dismissed.
B- Statement of Facts
Plaintiffs James and Margaret Kilpatrick fded their complaint for personal injury
and loss of consortium on February 9, 2001. (R. 1). They alleged injuries to James
resulting from exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products, and loss of
consortium. (R. 1-55). On May 7, 2001, the court adopted its Case Management Order
No.l, which applies to all cases alleging injury due to exposure to asbestos. (Addendum).
In compliance with the court's order, James Kilpatrick signed an authorization for his
counsel to procure a full and complete autopsy upon his death (R. 1532). That
authorization was not signed by Mrs. Kilpatrick and she had no knowledge of it (Id.)
James Kilpatrick died on July 5, 2003. ( R. 1534). No autopsy was conducted, and Mr.
Kilpatrick's body was cremated. (Id.)
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On April 1, 2004, Margaret Kilpatrick filed a motion to substitute her as the named
plaintiff. (R. 1378 - 1380). The court entered an order to this end on May 27, 2004. (R.
1426 - 1428). Mrs. Kilpatrick filed her second amended complaint for survival, loss of
consortium, and wrongful death on June 23, 2004. (R. 1437 - 1446). Defendant
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company's ("BNRR'*) answer to the second
amended complaint was filed on August 12, 2004 (R1447 - 1452). On October 13, 2005,
more than two years after James Kilpatrick's death, defendant BNRR filed a motion to
dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with Case Management Order No. 1.
(R1497 - 1500). Specifically, defendant claimed plaintiffs' case must be dismissed for
failure to provide the body of James Kilpatrick for autopsy as required by Case
Management Order No. 1, section III, paragraph 5.a. (R. 1502) That paragraph provides
as follows:
"Plaintiffs spouse or another of plaintiff s representatives shall produce the
body of the deceased for one full and complete autopsy, including the
thoracic and abdominal cavities, to be performed by the State medical
examiner or a competent pathologist designated by plaintiffs counsel
unless otherwise ordered by the court upon good cause shown/'
This case management order was adopted by the court on May 7, 2001 and was amended
September 30, 2003. (Addendum). It is routinely applicable to all asbestos cases filed in
Salt Lake County by the Brayton ••• Purcell, LLP firm.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion noting that there was no evidence of fault in Mrs.
Kilpatrick^ s failure to procure an autopsy. (R. 1518-1604). Mrs. Kilpatrick provided a

7

sworn and notarized affidavit that she had been unaware that her husband had agreed to
have an autopsy conducted. (R. 1605-1606). She further noted that by the time she
notified her attorneys of her husband's death, he had already been cremated. (Id).
On March 3, 2006, the court issued a memorandum decision in which it
determined that the failure to obtain an autopsy of Mr. Kilpatrick was prejudicial to the
defendants and their ability to defend against the claims that Mr. Kilpatrick suffered from
an asbestos-related disease. (R. 1633-1637; Addendum). On March 21, 2006, the court
entered an order dismissing defendant BNRR. (R. 1638-1641).
On August 4, 2006 defendant Bullough Abatement, Inc. filed its motion to
dismiss all claims for failure to perform an autopsy. (R1764-1769). Plaintiffs again
opposed the motion to dismiss and the court again granted the dismissal On September
21,2006 the court filed a minute entry granting the motion to dismiss on the basis of the
memorandum of decision previously filed in response to the motion by BNRR. (R.17971798). Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on September 26, 2006. (R. 1799-1801).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court abused its discretion in granting the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims
for failure to comply with Case Management Order No. 1. While Utah law extends the
court great discretion in imposition of discovery sanctions, that discretion is not absolute.
"As an initial matter, before imposing sanctions..., 'the court must find on the part of
the noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory tactics
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frustrating the judicial process.'" Hales v. Oldroyd 999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 2000).
Nothing in the evidentiary record supports any finding that there was willfulness, bad
faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory tactics on the part of Mrs. Kilpatrick or any other
plaintiff.
Even if the court finds there is no abuse of discretion in applying the order, the
court must reverse the decision of the court because the case management order itself
exceeds the court's authority. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which authorizes physical
examination of the person of the plaintiff, requires the party seeking the examination to
demonstrate good cause for the examination U.R.CP. 37 (2006). The court's order
requiring an autopsy, a much more intrusive and abusive examination, reverses that
burden and places on the nonmoving party the burden to demonstrate good cause not to
conduct an autopsy- The State of Utah maintains a preference in its law against requiring
an autopsy because of the intrusive nature of that procedure. Further, the court's order is
not specific to the facts of any individual case but applies without limitation to all
asbestos cases. Without evidence of the necessity for an autopsy in an individual case,
imposition of a blanket order imposing an autopsy requirement in all cases is an abuse of
the court's authority.
If this court finds that the court's order is permissible under Utah law, application
of that order to the plaintiffs in this case is inappropriate. The action in which this order
was enforced, and in which dismissal was ordered, is a wrongful death action. The
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plaintiffs in this action, Mrs. Kilpatrick and the legal heirs of James Kilpatrick, were
unaware of the existence of the court's case management order, and the requirement that
an autopsy be conducted. By the time they informed their counsel of the death of James
Kilpatrick, his body had already been cremated. The legal heirs of James Kilpatrick were
not parties to the personal injury case in which the case management order was imposed.
It was in that case, prior to the amendment for wrongful death, in which the order was
allegedly violated
No plaintiff in the wrongful death case violated the court's order to conduct an
autopsy of James Kilpatrick. Those plaintiffs did not have a cause of action until James
Kilpatrick died, they had not asserted their cause of action until well after his body had
been cremated, and they had no ability to comply with any order to conduct an autopsy of
his body. Imposition of that order to dismiss their cause of action exceeds the court's
authority, is an abuse of discretion, and violates the plaintiffs' Constitutional right to have
their claims heard in court.
Further, even if the court's case management order was appropriate, its
imposition in this case was inappropriate. There is no barm to the defendants by the
failure to obtain an autopsy. This case stands today in the exact posture it would have
been had there been no personal injury case. Had James Kilpatrick simply died from the
effects of his exposure to asbestos, and had his heirs asserted their rights to damages
under the law of Utah based on that death, these defendants would have been in the same
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circumstances that they are in today. The simple fact that James Kilatrick asserted a
claim in his own right before he died does not deprive the defendants of any relevant
wrongful death evidence in this case. Plaintiffs in this case still have the burden to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent suffered from asbestosrelated disease for which the defendants are responsible and which caused his death. That
burden is not changed in the absence of an autopsy in this case. There is other substantial
evidence of causation on which to proceed. If, as the Defense claims, there is substantial
evidence calling into question the existence of an asbestos related disease, that evidence
is not adversely affected by the lack of autopsy results. Because neither side is prejudiced
by the absence of an autopsy, because the burden on the plaintiffs to prove their case
remains the same, it was an abuse of discretion in excess of the courts authority to order
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim in this case.
Finally, the court's reliance on the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") as
an additional ground for dismissing plaintiffs' survival and wrongful death claims is in
error because James Kilpatrick did not violate any discovery order which would have
effected his rights under the FELA. Moreover, Mr. Kilpatrick had viable and ongoing
FELA claims at the time of his death, when the case management order was allegedly
violated, an action he was incapable of causing. Accordingly, this court should reverse
the decision of the court and remand the case for discovery and trial

11

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR
FAILING TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF JAMES KILPATRICK FOR AN
AUTOPSY
A.

The Court's Action Was Improper Because the Record Fails to Demonstrate
Any Fault on the Part of the Plaintiffs Which Would Support a Sanction of
Dismissal.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim as a sanction for failure to comply with

the court's case management order which requires that when a personal injury plaintiff in
an asbestos-related lawsuit dies, his spouse or other representative must produce the body
for an autopsy. This requirement is contained in the section of the court's Case
Management Order No, 1 which is entitled "Additional Discovery." (Addendum). It is
intended to be a discovery order. See, Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 1997, 943
P.2d 260 [while ruling was not designated as an order compelling discovery, that was
inarguably the substance of the order.] Accordingly, the dismissal for failure to comply
with that portion of the order is a discovery sanction. Under Utah law, however, to
impose a discovery sanction of dismissal, there must be a showing that the party being
sanctioned is at fault. No such showing was made in this case.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits imposition of dismissal as a sanction in
discovery. (Utah R. Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C)) (2006). Utah courts have long held that courts
have wide discretion in imposing the appropriate sanctions for violation of discovery
rules. Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, \ 15, 981 P.2d 407; see also Utah Dep't of
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Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P,2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). But, the discretion of the court in
imposing sanctions for violations of discovery orders is not unbridled.
The striking of pleadings, entering of default, and rendering of judgment
against a disobedient part}' are the most severe of the potential sanctions
that can be imposed upon a nonresponding party. Because of the severity of
this type of sanction, 'the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow
than when the court is imposing less severe sanctions."
Marshallv. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 515 (Utah App.1996). As the United States
Supreme Court (as well as Utah Courts) has pointed out:
Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal to respond to a court order
compelling discovery is a harsh sanction and therefore, requires ika showing
of'willfulness, bad faith, or fault' on the part of the non-complying party."
Fed. Sav, & Loan Ass% 684 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Societe Internationale v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.CL 1087, 2 L.Ed2d 1255 (1958)). "Willful
failure" has been defined as "c 'any intentional failure as distinguished from
involuntary noncompliance.'"
Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v. Schettler 768 P.2d 950, 961 -962 (Utah App.,1989).
The court's action dismissing the claims of the plaintiffs in this case is an abuse
of discretion because the record is totally devoid of any willfulness, bad faith, or fault on
the part of any of the plaintiffs. Neither the moving party's motion, nor the argument in
the court on the motions, nor the courts memorandum of decision point to any willfulness,
bad faith, or fault. The only point raised by the defendants, and the only support relied
upon by the court was the simple absence of an autopsy. The defendants did not attempt
to demonstrate, nor did the court find any fault on the part of the plaintiffs.
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The court's failure to find willfulness, bad faith, or fault is due to the simple fact
that there was none. The unchallenged facts show that Mrs. Kilpatrick was unaware that
her husband had signed an autopsy authorization. (R. 1605-1606). Mrs. Kilpatrick was
unaware that the court expected an autopsy to be conducted. By the time Mrs. Kilpatrick
informed her attorneys that her husband had died, he had already been cremated. {Id.) At
that point, there was nothing any plaintiff could do, there was nothing that counsel could
do, to comply with an order to produce the body for autopsy. There is no evidence that
this failure was anything but unconscious, unknowing, and without fault. Because the
court failed to find the predicate elements necessary to support a sanction of dismissal,
that sanction was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
The inappropriateness of the sanction of dismissal in this case is further
demonstrated by the frequently stated purpose behind the imposition of discovery
sanctions. cc[S]anctions are intended to deter misconduct in connection with discovery.
First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass1n of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266
(Utah,1984)(C//z>7£ National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., All U.S.
639, 1976). See also, Utah Dep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d4, 8 (Utah 1995).
Surely there is no misconduct to deter in this case. No sanction the court could impose
will enable this widow to turn back the clock and order an autopsy, nor is it likely to make
her more compliant on the next such occasion. The sanction is unwarranted under the law
of this state. As such, it is an abuse of discretion and must be overturned.

14

B.

The Trial Court's Case Management Order, Requiring an Autopsy in Every
Asbestos Case in Which the Plaintiff Dies, Exceeds the Trial Court's Legal
Authority and Must Be Stricken.
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the court inappropriately struck their claims as a

discovery sanction. If this court somehow concludes that imposition of a discovery
sanction was appropriate under the facts of this case, it must nonetheless reverse the
judgment of the court because the case management order itself exceeds the court's
authority.
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that "since the most ancient of times
people have had a reverent regard for the remains of their loved ones..., and this naturally
includes an ardent desire that their remains be treated with respect and allowed to remain
in undisturbed peace/' Smart v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). For this reason, the
authority to order an autopsy is limited in statute, and infrequently exercised.1 Even in
l

Cases in which an autopsy is either required or permitted are set out in statute as
follows:
(1) The medical examiner shall perform an autopsy to:
(a) aid in the disco very and prosecution of a crime;
(b) protect an innocent person accused of a crime; and
(c) disclose hazards to public health.
(2) The medical examiner may perform an autopsy:
(a) to aid in the administration of civil justice in life and accident insurance problems in
accordance with Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers1 Compensation Act;
(b) in other cases involving questions of civil liability.
U.C.A. §26-4-13(1953)

15

cnose cases in which statute provides authority to direct an autopsy, the Supreme Court
has recognized that such provisions do not provide an "absolute right" to litigants to have
an autopsy performed. Rather, the authority must be exercised with discretion. Silver
King Coalition Mines Co. V. Industrial Commission, 204 P.2d 811, (Utah 1949).
A similar limitation exists in Utah rule of Civil Procedure 35 which provides for
physical examination of the person of the plaintiff in appropriate situations U.R.C.P. 35
(2006). Rule 35 provides that an order for such an examination may be entered only after
a motion and "upon good, cause shown."2 In this case, the court's order for an autopsy is
an order for a physical examination of the body. But, in an ironic twist, that order does
not require the party seeking the autopsy to show good cause that it be ordered. Rather,
the court's order reverses the burden and imposes upon the party being examined a
requirement that it demonstrate good cause why no such examination should be
conducted. Because this court's order reverses the burden imposed by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 35, it exceeds the authority of the court and must therefore be stricken as
inappropriate.

2

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 35(a) Order for Examination- When the mental
or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party or of a person in the custody
or under the legal control of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is
pending may order the party or person to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
suitably licensed or certified examiner or to produce for examination the person in the
party's custody or legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause
shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify
the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or
persons by whom it is to be made. (Emphasis added)
16

Finally, the court's order exceeded its authority because it is not specific to the
facts of each individual case. While the law recognizes, and plaintiffs freely admit, that
an order to conduct an autopsy may be appropriate in certain cases, it is certainly not a
requirement, nor is it appropriate, in every asbestos case. Nothing in the court's order
clarifies or explains or defines those factors which will or will not make an autopsy
appropriate. The right to order an autopsy requires a sound exercise of discretion. Silver
King Coalition Mines, supra, 204 P.2d at 815-16. The order in question here eliminates
all exercise of discretion by the court. It directs an autopsy in each and every case.
Because the order eliminates that exercise of discretion, it violates the underlying
statutory authority and it is invalid. Accordingly the courf s order exceeds its authority
and must be invalidated by this court.
C

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims Because the Wrongful
Death Plaintiffs Had No Ability to Comply with the Court's Order,
At the time Margaret Kilpatrick was substituted as the named plaintiff in this case,

and the complaint was amended to add causes of action for survival and wrongful death,
it was too late to conduct an autopsy on the body of James Kilpatrick. Mr. Kilpatrick's
body had already been cremated. (R. 1518-1604, R. 1605-1606) Despite this fact and
despite the fact that the wrongful death plaintiffs, the heirs of Mr, Kilpatrick, had never
had a chance to be subject to the court's jurisdiction, the court's order nonetheless struck
their claim without any recourse. This decision was a violation of the wrongful death
17

plaintiffs right under the Utah Constitution to have their claims heard in the court.
Accordingly, the court's order must be reversed.
The Utah Constitution, article 11, section 3, provides each individual the right to
have his or her claim heard in the court (935). The legal heirs of Mr. Kiipatrick were
denied that right by the court's decision dismissing the action. They had no ability to
comply with the court's order. It was not an order to which they were ever subject prior
to the cremation of Mr. Kiipatrick. In an, analogous situation the Court held:
a person who puts forth every reasonable effort to comply with a court order
and still is unable to do so, is not guilty of contempt on account of such
failure.
Limb v. Limb, 113 Utah 385, 389, 195 P.2d 263, 265 (1948); See, alsoJeppson v.
Jeppson, 597 P.2d 1345 (1975).
An order which is incapable of being obeyed cannot be a valid order. The
application of this fact is incorporated in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. As noted
above, Rule 37 authorizes imposition of sanctions for failure to cooperate in discovery.
In addressing the sanctions available for failing to permit a physical examination of the
plaintiff ordered under Rule 35, the rule provides:
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), such
orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision,
unless the party failing to comply is unable to produce such person for
examination. (2006)
The circumstance contemplated by this rule is exactly the circumstance which pertains
here. The legal heirs of Mr. Kiipatrick had no ability to produce his body for
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examination. By the time their claim was filed the body was already cremated. Yet,
despite the plain language of the rule that in such circumstance an order dismissing the
complaint is not appropriate, the court dismissed their claims. In so doing, the court
deprived them of their Constitutional right to have their claims heard in the court.
Because the courf s order was without support in the law, and because the effect of that
order was to deprive plaintiffs of their Constitutional right, the court's order must be
stricken and the judgment reversed.
D.

The Trial Court Erred in Striking Plaintiffs' Complaint Because
it Erroneously Concluded That Defendants Were Prejudiced by
the Lack of an Autopsy.
In its memorandum decision granting the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims,

the court explained that the lack of an autopsy was prejudicial to the defendants in this
matter. That conclusion, which fonns the support for the court's decision, is factually in
error. The lack of an autopsy in this case has not in any way prejudiced the defendants.
The defendants, and indeed the court, seem to believe that an autopsy would
provide conclusive proof of causation in this case. However, the law does not require
conclusive proof of causation. Rather it requires proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. There is significant other evidence in the case to meet this burden.
Other courts have recognized that autopsy results are not necessary to prove
causation. In Hess v Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 795 RE.2d 91 (Ohio CL App 2003), the
plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant railroad. The
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defendant requested that the family of each plaintiff conduct a limited autopsy of the
lungs and pleura. On appeal the defendant argued that because counsel for the plaintiffs
failed to notify it of the autopsies, it missed its chance to conduct a full autopsy to
detennine the cause of death and moved to exclude any testimony relevant to the cause of
death due to spoliation of the evidence. Rejecting the defendant's motion and argument
that they were prejudiced, the court stated that "independent evidence pertaining to the
cause of death of each of the [plaintiffs] was established by their individual death
certificates, through testimony from expert witnesses, and through their medical records.
It would have been improper for the court to exclude all evidence as to the cause of death
simply because a full autopsy had not been completed.5' {Id, at 100).
As in the Hess case, other independent evidence relating to Mr. Kiipatrick's cause
of death is available to the parties here. In opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss,
plaintiffs provided copies of reports from expert witnesses who would be expected to
testify as to the nature of Mr. Kiipatrick's illness and the cause of death. Medical records
from the University of Utah Medical Center, Lakeview Hospital and Mr. Kiipatrick's
treating physicians exist, as well as the tissue from the biopsies. (R. 1600-1601). There
was an examination and resulting death certificate for Mr. Kiipatrick. Equally
importantly, the defendants had more than two years to conduct their own Rule 35
examination of Mr. Kiipatrick and they chose not to request the exam.
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Moreover, the conduct of, or failure to conduct an autopsy does not alter the
burden of proof standards for civil injury and wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury or death is caused by the exposure to
asbestos. In Alder v. Bayer Corporation, 61 P.3d 1068, 1085 (Utah, 2002), the Utah
Supreme court gave insightful instruction on how Utah courts should address causation
issues in toxic tort claims. The Court said:
Individuals routinely feel the effects of a wide array of common phenomena
whose mechanisms remain unexplained by science, including, for example,
the law of gravity, the nature of light, the source of personality, and the
process of ceil differentiation. If a bicyclist falls and breaks his arm,
causation is assumed without argument because of the temporal
relationship between the accident and the injury. The law does not object
tliat no one measured the exact magnitude and angle of the forces applied
to the bone. . Legally, an observable sequence of condition > event >
altered condition, has been found sufficient to establish causation even
when the exact mechanism is unknown.
The Court ended its discussion by advising Utah courts that plaintiffs with toxic
exposures "enjoy the opportunity to prove that which they can, as do those of more
prosaic injuries/' Id

Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to prove that asbestos exposure

caused Mr. Kilpatrickf s death. The burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence
and plaintiffs are to "enjoy the opportunity to prove that which they can." Here, plaintiffs
should be granted the same opportunity as the plaintiffs in Alder, to put forth the evidence
that exists to a finder of fact to determine whether the evidence establishes that Mr
Kiipatrick's death was more likely than not caused by his exposure to asbestos for which
the defendants are responsible.
21

E,

The Trial Court's Reliance on the FELA as a Basis for Dismissing the
Plaintiffs5 Claims was Error Because James Kilpatrick Did Not Violate the
Case Management Order
By stipulation, plaintiffs' claims against defendant BNRR were limited to those

under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). (R. 1469-1472). The court focused
on this limitation in its memorandum decision as an additional basis for dismissing the
claims of the legal heirs. In a somewhat curious comment, the court noted:
Because this action is governed by the FELA, under which the rights and
obligations of the heirs are derived from those of the decedent, the spouse
and children of the decedent are subject to the regulations, orders and
statutes governing the decedent's personal injury as if they were the
decedent.
(R- 1634; Addendum) The meaning of, or reason for this statement is unclear. It is
apparently the court's response to the plaintiffs' argument, cited earlier in the
memorandum decision, that:
[N]one of [the] legal heirs were parties to the matter, and as such, the CMO
would not apply to their separate and distinct claims for the wrongful death
of their father. At most, argue Plaintiffs, Mrs. Kiipatrick's claims for
personal injury damages that survived following the death may be at risk for
failing to procure the autopsy. However, note Plaintiffs, her separate and
distinct claims for wrongful death should not
The court is correct that the statutes governing the decedent's case affect the heirs
as if they were the decedent See Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 345 (1928)
[wrongful death action under FELA impermissible where injured employee had entered
into a settlement with his employer for his injuries during his lifetime]; Frese v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 4 (1923) [holding that wrongful death action under FELA
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could not be brought where injured employee would have been precluded by his
negligence from recovering in a personal injury suit]; Walrod v. Southern Pac. Co^AAl
F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1971) [injured employee obtained judgment against employer in
FELA action; court held that wrongful death action could not be brought after the
employee's death because, under Flynn, a wrongful death action requires that the
employee had a personal injury cause of action at the time of death]. The court is
mistaken, however, in finding that anything in James Kilpatrick^ s personal injury case
barred the legal heirs from pursuing their wrongful death action.
As noted above, at the time he died, James Kilpatrick had valid, active, and on
going claims for personal injury. He had complied with the court's order by signing an
authorization for an autopsy. He was in total compliance with all the "regulations, orders,
and statutes" governing the FELA case. The legal heirs had no cause of action until
James Kilpatrick died. At that time, when the cause of action arose, nothing in the
personal injury case limited their wrongful death action under FELA. Thus, the court's
conclusion to the contrary is an error of law and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs in this matter have been wrongly deprived of their right under the
Utah Constitution to have their day in court. The court's orders dismissing the plaintiffs'
claims because of their failure to produce the body of James Kilpatrick for autopsy were
without legal authority. There was no showing of any willfulness, bad faith or fault on
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the part of any of the plaintiffs. Such findings are essential predicates to the imposition of
a sanction of dismissal. The absence of any such evidence makes the court's orders
invalid- Moreover, the court's case management order itself conflicts with, and reverses
the burden established by the Supreme Court when it adopted Rule of Civil Procedure 35
and its procedure for ordering a physical examination of the plaintiff Because
application of these invalid orders deprived the plaintiffs of their right to have their
claims heard, and because there was no prejudice to the defendants due to the lack of an
autopsy, the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims was in error.
Accordingly, plaintiffs respectfully request that this court reverse the judgment of
the court and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this ^?/Aday of June, 2007.
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & MORTON

)K MILD
COURTNEY G. BROADEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET KILPATRICK,
I n d i v i d u a l l y , and as P e r s o n a l
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e on b e h a l f of
L e g a l H e i r s o f JAMES
KILPATRICK, d e c e a s e d ,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
C a s e No.

010901285

H o n o r a b l e GLENN K. IWASAKI
Court

ClerkflLlBi^xflfSffrSOURT
Third Judicial District
March 2 , 2006

M* - 3 2006

ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company's Motion
to Dismiss All Claims of Plaintiff for Failure to Comply with
Case Management Order No, 1.

The Court heard oral argument with

respect to the motion on February, 27, 2006.

Following the

hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following rulingWith this motion, Defendants seek dismissal of the wrongful
death claims brought by Margaret Kilpatrick, individually, and as
Personal Representative on behalf of the legal heirs of James
Kilpatrick based upon a violation of the Case Management Order
(*CMO") requiring autopsy.,
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing DefendantsUhad an

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KILPATRICK v. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS

opportunity to perform a Rule 35 exam during Mr. Kilpatrick's
life and did, in fact, do so. Additionally, contend Plaintiffs,
adequate tissue samples were available to Defendants to evaluate
the same evidence as Plaintiff, to wit; the cause of Decedent's
cancer.

Moreover, assert Plaintiffs, although upon his death his

wife, Margaret Kilpatrick, was a party to the personal injury
case, none of his remaining legal heirs were parties to the
matter, and as such, the CMO would not apply to their separate
and distinct claims for the wrongful death of their father. At
most, argue Plaintiffs, Mrs, Kilpatrick's claims for personal
injury damages that survived following the death may be at risk
for failing to procure the autopsy.

However, note Plaintiffs,

her separate and distinct claims for wrongful death should not.
It is Plaintiffs' position the evidence which is present for the
Plaintiffs in this wrongful death case is the same as that which
is available to the Defendants and the medical evidence that
exists, and that will be forthcoming through expert opinion, is
sufficient to prove a prima facie case as it relates to asbestos
being the cause of Mr, Kilpatrick's death.

Indeed, argue

Plaintiffs, even an autopsy which may or may not have revealed
asbestos fibers or asbestos bodies would not prove with certainty
the cause of death.
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KILPATRICK v. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to the Case Management Order entered in this
matter:
Plaintiff's spouse or another of plaintiff's
representatives shall produce the body of the
deceased for one full and complete autopsy,
including thoracic and abdominal cavities, to
be performed by the state medical examiner or
a competent pathologist designated by
plaintiff's counsel unless otherwise ordered
by the Court upon good cause shown.
CMO §111, % 5(a) .
Because this action is governed by the FELA, under which the
rights and obligations of the heirs are derived from those of the
decedent, the spouse and children of the decedent are subject to
the regulations, orders and statutes governing the decedent's
personal injury as if they were the decedent.
Moreover, the CMO (a product of much negotiation and debate
among the parties) provides that, "Plaintiff's spouse or another
of plaintiff's representatives shall produce the body. . . ."

In

addition, Plaintiffs have-admitted that Mr. Kilpatrick signed an
authorization for their counsel to produce a full and complete
autopsy after his death.
Finally, Plaintiffs' destruction of the body prejudices
Defendant because it completely eliminates the Defendant's
ability to find out if Mr. Kilpatrick's lungs would have
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KILPATRICK v. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

evidenced any exposure to asbestos over and above the usual
background levels.
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Company's Motion to Dismiss All Claims of
Plaintiff for Failure to Comply with Case Management Order No. 1
is granted.
DATED this 5?

day of March, 2006.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Th rd Judicial

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

, — N 3 0 2003

'

Dwtrict

By

IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION
JUAW second Amended Case Management Order

010900863^^1^3^

Deputy Cleric

SECOND AMENDED CASE
MANAGEMENT ORDER NO. 1

Case No. 010900863 AS
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki

Based upon representations by various potential plaintiffs' counsel to the judges of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, this Order is entered in anticipation of a
substantial increase in asbestos litigation in Utah courts.
This order is intended to facilitate the administration of those cases involving allegations
of asbestos exposure by reducing multiple filings and hearings and by setting out orders for the
orderly disposition of such cases. This order shall apply to all cases filed by Brayton Purcell and
by Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole in which a claim for money damages is based
upon allegations of exposure to products containing asbestos and/or machinery calling for the use
of asbestos ("asbestos cases").
L
GENERAL PROCEDURES
1-

Cover Sheet: A cover sheet shall be filed with each pleading. The cover sheet

shall list the party filing the pleading and its counsel; it shall also list in a vertical column all
other parties.
2.

Master Service List: Plaintiffs' counsel shall maintain a master service list of all

counsel representing parties in any asbestos cases governed by this Order. Defense counsel shall

e-mail fheir addresses to plaintiffs' counsel at the time they enter their appearances. An updated
copy of this master service list will also be filed in the offices of Judge IwasakL It is the
responsibility of all parties to ensure that the current master service list, as updated, is used for
the service of all master pleadings.
3.

Service of Pleadings and Documents: Any party required to serve any notice in an

asbestos case shall serve one copy of the document on counsel for each party as they appear on
the service list for that individual case, and file it with the Court as appropriate.
a.

The parties may stipulate to service of any pleading, discovery document,

or other written material by e-mail (ne-serviceM) in lieu of standard service by mail or hand
delivery, and are encouraged to do so. Such e-service shall be deemed the same as service by
hand delivery for computing time to file a response.
b.

No party will be deemed bound by e-service unless it has affirmatively

stated that it will agree to such service in writing, but if such an election is made by a party in one
case, it will be deemed effective in all cases until expressly rejected in writing. Also, if an
attorney stipulates to e-service on behalf of one client s/he will be expected to accept e-service
for all his/her clients. Parties may reject a prior e-service agreement if such an election is not
made.
4.

Status of Service of Process: At the time Initial Disclosures by plaintiff are due,

plaintiffs5 counsel shall provide a list of all parties who have been served to date and their
attorneys. The Certificate of Service on the Initial Disclosures is sufficient to satisfy this
requirement Defendants shall have forty-five (45) days from the date of proper service in which
to file an Answer or otherwise plead.
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5.

Rules of Civil Procedure: The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all

asbestos cases except to the extent that those rules are modified by this Second Amended Case
Management Order.
6.

Master Pleadings: It is hereby ordered that an action entitled In re: Asbestos

Litigation, Master Case No. 010900863 AS, shall become the Master case for all cases involving
exposure to asbestos-containing products. This Master Asbestos Case shall serve as a depository
for all asbestos liability actions. Pleadings, discovery matters, motions, orders, exhibit and
witness lists, pre-trial statements and other documents common to all cases shall be filed only in
the Master Asbestos Case and not in any individual case. When counsel enters an appearance for
the first time for a particular defendant, s/he should file his/her notice of appearance in the
Master Asbestos Case. Counsel are thereafter required to notify the Clerk of Court of all changes
in their address, telephone numbers, and fax numbers.
a.

In each case, the parties may, if they wish, incorporate by reference any

specifically described master pleading, whether that master pleading is filed by that party or by
any other party;
b.

Plaintiffs counsel should file a Master Complaint and then incorporate it

by reference in a brief complaint filed on behalf of each individual plaintiff;
c.

Defendants are encouraged to file Master Answers and to incorporate their

Master Answers by reference in answering the individual Complaints filed on behalf of each
plaintiff.
d.

Any party shall have the right to move against or contest any master

pleading as though that master pleading were filed in an individual case.
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7.

Attribution of Fault: In each case in which a railroad is included as a defendant

and alleged to be liable under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, that railroad
defendant is presumed to have properly pled cross-claims for contribution and indemnity against
all other defendants, and all other defendants likewise are deemed to have pled a general denial
to the railroad defendant's contribution and indemnity cross-claims. Until further order of the
Court, all non-railroad defendants are presumed to have no cross-claims against one another for
contribution, indemnity or allocation of fault. However, consistent with § 78-27-41, Utah Code
Ann., those defendants will notify plaintiffs' counsel, by the date set in the attorneys' planning
meeting or upon further order of the Court, of the identity of those non-party defendants it
intends to place on the juiy verdict form for purposes of the allocation of fault Nothing herein
precludes any railroad defendant from bringing third-party claims for contribution or indemnity.
8.

Pro Hac Vice Admissions:
a.

Motion for admission: When local counsel seek a first time association

and admission of an out-of-state attorney, local counsel shall present Judge Iwasaki with an exparte motion and related paperwork that shall fully comply with all requirements of Utah law.
The motion shall be filed in the master case file, bearing the case number noted on this Case
Management Order.
b.

Scope of order: An order admitting counsel pro hac vice in a Salt Lake

County asbestos exposure case shall provide that it is effective in all then pending actions and
shall be effective in any future actions filed in Salt Lake County alleging damages from asbestos
exposure. Once an out-of-state attorney has been admitted in any case pursuant to this Case
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Management Order, local counsel need only file a copy of the order admitting that counsel in any
other asbestos-related case in which the out-of-state attorney wishes to appear.
c.

Notice of changes: Local counsel and an out-of-state attorney admitted pro

hac vice shall promptly notify the Court of any changes in the out-of-state attorney's bar
admission status.
&

Timing of Filings Orders for admission pro hac vice may be filed at any

time prior to the last judicial day before trial. Motions for admission pro hac vice or related
orders made subsequent to that time will be granted only for good cause shown.
9.

Non-waiver of Rights: By entry of this Case Management Order, the parties have

not w aived any of their rights including, but not limited to, the right to contest joinder,
jurisdiction, or venue, or the right to seek removal to federal court Moreover, the parties have
not waived their rights to assert or contest the manner in which these cases shouId be tried nor
have the parties waived their rights to seek modifications of this order in individual cases upon
motion and for good cause shown.
10.

Preservation of Privileges: The j oint defense privilege and the common interest

privilege are preserved to the extent allowed under the law of Utah and, by conferring or meeting
or exchanging documents, defendants have not waived any attorney/client or work product
privilege.
11.

Amendment of Case Management Order: For good cause shown, any party may

move, or the court may act on its own motion, to amend this Case Management Order.
12.

Severance of Punitive Damages: The Court has taken the issue of whether to sever

any claims for punitive damages from the compensatory damages under advisement
-5-

13.

Amendment of Complaints: Plaintiffs may amend their comp\aint in any case,

prior to the completion of discovery, without stipulation of the parties or leave of court, provided
that the only purpose for the amendment is to add additional defendants to the case, and no
substantive changes are made to the allegations against any existing defendant
14,

Dismissal of Complaints: Plaintiffs may unilaterally dismiss a case without

prejudice at any time prior to the close of discovery in the case based upon a determination that
the case cannot be successfully pursued. The procedure for unilateral dismissal may not be
employed, however, if the plaintiflFor plaintiffs counsel reasonably believes that the case may be
refiled in this or another jurisdiction at any time in the future. When Plaintiffs unilaterally
dismiss a case without prejudice based upon a determination that the case cannot be successfully
pursued, the presumed cross-claims for contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as
established by section 1.7 of this order, are deemed dismissed without prejudice.

IL
DISCOVERY: INITIAL PHASE
1.

Initial Disclosures: No later than 30 days after the filing of the first answer to a

complaint plaintiff shall serve his/her Initial Disclosures, which shall include all of die
information required by Ruie 26(a)(1) pVus:
2L

The exposed person's Social Security Number;

b.

The exposed person's date of birth;

a

A complete list of the exposed person's employers, with last known
addresses and phone numbers, to the extent reasonably available;
-6-

d.

The exposed person's medical history; and

e.

A complete list of all of the exposed persons' health insurance carriers for
the last 10 years.

2.

Authorization for Obtaining Records: Simultaneous with the filing and service of

the initial disclosures, plaintiff will provide to n i attoi ney designated h di tens* i ounsel signed
original authorizations (current within 120 days) to enable defendants to obtain medical records,
VA records, union records, income tax records, Social Security earnings records, Social Security
disability records, Social Security Printouts, military records, worker's compensation records,
and past or present employers' personnel records.
a.

These authorizations are for documents, pathology material, and original

radiological films and are not to be construed to authorize verbal communications that are not
otherwise allowable.
b.

These records described in this paragraph 2 of Section II, which are

produced by any party pursuant to these authorizations, are determined b> the* t i >urt lo be
authentic under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, unless specific objection is made thereto at
least thirty (30) days prior to trial.
c.

These records are not to be filed with the Court.

d.

The attorney designated by defendants to receive the authorizations shall

make a complete copy of all records obtained pursuant to these authorizations available to
plaintiffs counsel.
3.

Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents:

No later than one-hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of a complaint, plaintiff shall serve a
-7-

copy of the plaintiffs responses to Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents, together with a copy of the requested documents. The Master
Interrogatories and Requests for Production are deemed served at the time plaintiff files his/her
complaint
4.

Defendants' Initial Disclosures: No later than thirty (30) days after filing its

answer, each defendant shall serve its initial disclosures.
5.

Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents:

Each defendant shall serve responses to Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for
Production within thirty (30) days after service of Plaintiff s responses to Defendants' Master
Interrogatories and Requests for Production. The Plaintiffs Master Interrogatories and Requests
for Production are deemed served at the time the defendant is properly served with process.
6.

Attorneys' Planning Conference: As soon as practicable after filing plaintiffs

Initial Disclosures and after service has been perfected on all named defendants which are subject
to service and are not engaged in private settlement negotiations with the plaintiff, plaintiffs
counsel shall convene an attorneys' planning conference with all defense counsel The
conference may be held by telephone,
a.

At this planning conference all counsel shall agree on the following:
1.

The date by which plaintiff shall identify;
(a)

the asbestos-containing products, or types of products
manufactured or distributed by a particular defendant, to
which he/she was allegedly exposed;
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(b)

the period of time during which plaintiff alleges that the
exposure occurred;

(c)

the location at which plaintiff alleges that the exposure
occurred;

(dj

the manner in which plaintiff alleges he/she was exposed to
each identified product, and whether plaintiff alleges that
the exposure was direct or indirect;

(e)

any documents plaintiff contends will support the
identification of each product specified; and

(f)

the names, addresses and telephone numbers of any and all
witnesses who will testify to plaintiffs exposure to each
identified product; provided, however, that witnesses who
are asbestos plaintiffs themselves shall be contacted, if at
alt, through their asbestos counsel; and provided further
that, to the extent reasonably possible, defendants will
coordinate their contacts with plaintiffs product
identification witnesses in an effort to protect them from an
inordinate number of interview requests.

2.

Hie deadline for completing factual discovery;

3.

The date, following the close of fact discovery, by which
defendants shall identify those non-parties to whom they shall seek
to allocate fault;
-9-

4,

The date by which plaintiffs counsel shall designate plaintiffs
case-specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert
witness reports as follows:
(a)

Injury and Damage Experts: Plaintiffs counsel shall serve
case-specific expert witness reports with respect to
Plaintiffs injury and damage claims;

(b)

Industrial Hygienists: Plaintiffs counsel may serve a single
work-site specific expert witness report for all cases
involving the same work-site if the expert is not expected to
present case-specific testimony at trial; and

(c)

General Experts: Defendant's counsel may serve a Master
Expert Report for any experts who will testify generally,
and not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site
specific information.

5-

The dale (typically 60 to 120 days after the plaintiffs designation
of expert witnesses and service of Rule 26(aX3)(B) expert witness
reports) by which defendants' counsel shall designate defendants'
case-specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert
witness reports as follows:
(a)

Injury and Damage Experts: Defendants5 counsel shall
serve case-specific expert witness reports with respect to
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any expert witnesses expected to testify with respect to
plaintiffs injury and damage claims;
(b)

ljiduUu.il Hygienists: 1 Hoidajit.s1 couns* 1 may serve a
single work-site specific expert witness report for all cases
involving the same work-site if the witness is not expected
to give case-specific testimony at trial; and

(c)

General Experts: Defendants' counsel may serve a Master
Expert Report for any experts win i wi 1 i testify generally,
and not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site
specific information.

b.

6.

The deadline for completing expert witness discovery; and

7.

The deadline for filing dispositive motions.

If counsel are unable to reach an agreement regarding these matters, any
party may file a motion for a scheduling conference with the court
pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

c.

If at any time after the Attorneys' Planning Meeting has been held and/or a
scheduling order has been entered in a particular case, a plaintiff amends
his/her complaint to add additional defendants in the case, a new
Attorneys' Planning Meeting will be convened, including counsel for the
new parties, to consider whether changes to the scheduling order are
appropriate under the circumstances.
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in.
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY
L

Supplementing Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Requests for

Production: If plaintiffs or defendants have previously answered Interrogatories or Requests for
Production, they need only supplement their answers to those Interrogatories or Requests
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but required supplementation shall occur no later
than thirty (30) days before trial, absent special circumstances.
2.

Rule 35 Examinations of Plaintiff: Defendants are entitled to arrange for the Rule

35 examinations) of the plaintiff if living, to be conducted by a physician(s) of defendants'
choice and at defendants1 expense.
a.

Defendants shall agree among themselves on the identity of the specialist

who will conduct the Rule 35 examination. Under ordinary circumstances, plaintiff shall be
examined by only one physician.
b.

In those cases where plaintiff alleges physical and/or mental conditions

that require assessment by more than one specialist, plaintiff may be required to submit to an
additional physical or mental examination for each condition. The need for these additional Rule
35 examinations shall be determined on a case-by-case basis.
c.

The Rule 35 examination will be conducted in Salt Lake County to the

extent possible. In those cases where the plaintiff is unable to travel, the Rule 35 examination
will be conducted in the community where plaintiff resides,
&

The parties recognize that there may be circumstances under which a Rule

35 examination may need to be conducted by a physician located outside the State of Utah. The
-12-

need for and arrangements pertaining to such an. examination shall be i esol ved on a case-by-case
basis,
3.

Pathology Materials; Plaintiff agrees to provide to one defendants attorney all of

the plaintiffs pathology materials and those original chest images in his/her possession, as soon
as practicable, but no later than one-hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the complaint
absent special circumstances.
a.

The Defense Counsel to whom these materials are delivered shall be the

custodian of the plaintiffs pathology materials, chest x-rays and related medica 1 materials when
they are provided for examination and all parties shall work together to allow all parties to use
these materials as needed in preparing their medical work up i ii these cases. Each defendant has
the absolute right to examine the pathology materials, chest images, and related medical
materials independently of the other defendants.
b.

Ail pathology materials, chest images and related medical materials

received directly from plaintiff shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel upon completion of the
defendants1 examination thereof. The parties may make agreements to share the costs and
acquisition of medical records, pathology materials, chest x-rays and related materials.
c.

No destructive testing will be done without giving thirty (30) days' prior

notice to all parties. Those parties objecting to the destructive testing shall file their objections
with the Court prior to the expiration of the 30-day notice period. If an objection is filed, no
destructive testing shall occur until the objection has been resolved.
d

The results of any destructive testing shall be made available to all parties

upon order of the courL
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c

Pathology materials and original radiological studies received pursuant to

plaintiffs authorization shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel no later than thirty (30) days prior
to trial.
4.

Written Report of Rule 35 Examination: The defendants shall serve a written

report of any Rule 35 examination described in paragraph 2 of this Section III, as soon as
practicable after the examination but no later than forty-five (45) days prior to the deadline for
completing expert discovery unless otherwise agreed by counsel.
5,

Notice of Death and Autopsy: Plaintiffs attorney, upon learning of the death of

Plaintiff shall immediately notify counsel for Defendants of Plaintiffs death.
a.

Plaintiffs spouse or another of plaintiffs representatives shall produce the

body of the deceased for one full and complete autopsy, including the thoracic and abdominal
cavities, to be performed by the state medical examiner or a competent pathologist designated by
plaintiffs counsel unless otherwise ordered by the court upon good cause shown.
b.

A showing of "good cause" may include religious beliefs and family

preferences regarding autopsies, although these factors are not necessarily determinative of the
issue.
c.

Appropriate and adequate quantities of tissue shall be obtained and

preserved for inspection and review by pathologists selected by the parties and all tissue samples
selected and preserved at the autopsy shall be made available to ail parties for appropriate
medical and pathological testing.
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IV.
NO EVIDENCE DISMISSAL
1.

No Evidence Letter: At the close of fact discovery pertinent to a specific
defendant, that defendant may, in good faith, serve a "No Evidence Letter" upon
plaintiff.
a.

The defendant must certify in the No Evidence Letter as follows:
(1)

that the attorney has reviewed, or caused to be reviewed by another
attorney or a legal assistant working under the direction of the
attorney, all of the exchanged discovery;

(2)

that the defendant has provided the plaintiff with all information in
its possession, custody, or control, other than expert witness
reports, which are required by the Case Management Order, or
pursuant to any discovery request or court order; and

(3)

that the plaintiffs discovery responses have not identified any
evidence tending to show plaintiff or plaintiffs decedent was
exposed to asbestos for which the defendant was responsible-

b.

Plaintiff must respond to a No Evidence Letter agreeing to dismiss the
defendant with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, or rejecting the
letter, no later than 10 days after service of the letter. Failure to respond
shall be deemed an agreement to dismissal. If plaintiff agrees to a
no evidence dismissal of a defendant under this provision, the presumed
cross-claims for contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants
-15-

against that defendant, as established by section L7 of this order, are
deemed dismissed with prejudice. This dismissal occurs only if the
railroad defendants were also served with the No Evidence Letter and did
not object within 10 days of service.
c.

If plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter, piaintiff must state the factual
and legal basis for rejecting it.

d.

If Plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter and/or refuses to agree to
dismissal with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, Defendant may file
a motion for summary judgment without the necessity of awaiting
completion of expert discovery. If such a motion is granted in Defendant's
favor, it will also be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as established by
section L7 of this order. The railroad defendants shall have the right to
oppose any such motion for summary judgment

e.

In the event a defendant files a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
this paragraph, plaintiff shall have 45 days within which to respond
V,
TRIAL SETTING

1.

Timing and Effect of Dispositive Motions: Except as set forth in Section IV,

dealing with No Evidence Dismissals, motions for summary judgment shall not be filed until
after the close of discovery- Motions to dismiss may be filed at any time aftertinecompletion of
discovery pertaining to the particular issue on which the motion to dismiss is based. Dispositive
-16-

motions granted in a defendant's favor shall be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants. The railroad defendants shall have the
right to oppose any defendant's dispositive motion If plaintiff's claim s against a railroad
defendant are dismissed on any basis, including No Evidence Letter, dispositive motion or
settlement, then that dismissal shall also be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as established by section L7 of this order.
2.

Trial Setting: Once dispositive motions have been decided and the remaining

parties have attempted to settle through mediation, an individual case may be set for trial.
3.

Exigent Cases: A case may be set for an exigent trial setting, which will occur, to

the extent possible, no later than seven months after the court declares the matter as an exigent
case.
a.

An exigent case is defined as follows:
(i)

Mesothelioma: any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in

writing by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with Malignant Mesothelioma, shall be presumed
exigent
(ii)

Lung Cancer, other Cancer and other Asbestos-Related Diseases:

any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in writing by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with
an asbestos related disease, and for whom the Board Certified Pulmonologist will sign an
affidavit stating that s/he has personally examined the plaintiff and that there is a substantial
medical doubt that the plaintiff will survive beyond six months.
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b.

Plaintiffs counsel shall file a motion seeking that a case be

designated as exigent. Defendants shall have 14 days thereafter to object on the basis that the
scheduled case does not meet the definition of an exigent case.
c.

Each exigent case will have a separate six-month pre-trial

scheduling order entered, using the same basic format as the attorneys' planning conference
format used in all non-exigent cases. Plaintiff may request a trial setting upon completion of its
obligation to prove complete medical records, pathological materials, autopsy reports (where
applicable) and product identification evidence.
d-

The subsequent death of the plaintiff will be considered just cause

for returning the case to a non-exigent status unless the court rules otherwise. Issues resulting
from the death of the plaintiff (e.g., failure to comply with formalities in regard to proper
substitution of plaintiff, medical and autopsy issues, impact on the jury if one has already been
impaneled, etc.) may be considered by the court in regard to a request for maintaining the case on
an exigent trial setting.
DATED this /O

day o f X ^ ^ T

, 2003.

Glenn K. Iwasaki
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company, by and through counsel, hereby certifies that
i tnir and correct copy of the foregoing proposed SECONi > <\ Mr-Ni )h 11 CASE
MANAGEMENT ORDER NO- 1 was served by mailing, postage prepaid, and/or by electronic
transmission, this 12th day of September, 2003 to the following parties:
3M (MINNESOTA MINING AND
MANUFACTURING COMPANY)
DOMCO

A. H. VOSS COMPANY
DRESSER INDUSTRIES
FLOUR DANIELS
FLOUR CORRORATION
1 FLOUR MAINTENANCE
[ HALLIBURTON COMPANY
KEERS ENVIRONMENTAL
KUBOTA CORPORATION
TIMKEN CORPORATION, THE
UTILITY TRAILER MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
i A. J. DEAN READY MIX CONCRETE
COMPANY
J

j STOEL RIVES, LLP
i D. Matthew Moscon Dmmoscon@,stoeLcom
]

mtrasich@,stoel.com
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3131

1

PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE &
LOVELESS
Patricia W. Christensen pwc(S),pwlaw.com
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1537
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750

i GREEN & BERRY
Raymond Scott Berry rsbeiry@xmission.com
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
[Facsimile: (801) 363-5658
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ABB LUMMUS GLOBAL, INC.
AIRCRAFT BRAKING SYSTEMS
CORP.
ALCOA, INC.
DURAMETALLIC CORPORATION
ELLIOTT COMPANY
GENERAL REFRACTORIES
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER
COMPANY
LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL
MODINE MANUFACTURING
NATIONAL DYNAMICS
STANDARD BUILDERS SUPPLY CO.
SYSTEMS
PLIBRICO LIBERTY MUTUAL
SAINT-GOBAIN
THE SKYNKOLOID COMPANY
UNION BOILERS
VICAR, INC.
YEATSE PIPE & SUPPLY CO.
ZURN INDUSTRIES, INC.
GREFCO, INC.
WESTPOINT STEVENS, INC.
CLAYTON INDUSTRIES
ALLRED'S, INC.
ARNOLD MACHINERY
BOILER, INC.
CLARK CORP.
ACE HARDWARE CORPORATION
THE ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY
BURNHAM CORPORATION
THE FLINTKOTE COMPANY
GARLOCK, INC.
INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND
ENGINE CORPORATION
UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES,
|lNC.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
Phillip S. Ferguson
Asbestos.Groups(a),chrisien.com
Rebecca L. Hill
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: 355-3431

STRONG &HANNI
1 Joseph J. Joyce asbestos f3>,strongandhannt.com
9 Exchange Place, 6* Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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AMOCO CORPORATION

AMCHEM
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES,
INC.
CERTAINTEED CORPORATION
DANA CORPORATION
FLEXATALLIC (GASKET HOLDINGS ;
INC)
MAREMONT CORPORATION
PNEUMO ABEX CORRORATION
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY
1 WAGNER ELECTRIC CORPORATION
AMERICAN BILTRTTE, INC.

SILVESTOR & CONROY 230 South 5tt East Suite 590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
532-2266
532-2270 (fax)
Fred R. Silvester frs@silconlaw.com
Spencer Sibers scs(3jsilconlaw.com
BAKER & HOSTETLER, LLP
Mary Price Birk Mbirk@,baker-hostetler.com
Ronald L. Hellbusch Rhellbusch(2),bakerlaw.coin
303 East 17* Ave. Suite 1100
Denver, Colorado 80203
(303) 861-0600

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Ross I. Romero Rromero(g),i oneswaldo.com
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
521-3200
MARKUSSON, GREEN & JARVIS, P.C.
Dennis H. Markusson Markusson@mgilaw.com
William B. Stanton Green@mgi law.com
999 Eighteenth Street, Suite 3300
Denver, Colorado 80202

ANDERSON LUMBER
BOMBARDIER
THE BUDD COMPANY
HAYES LEMMERZ INTERNATIONAL
HOWELL INC.
KELSEY HAYES
KIRKHILL RUBBER COMPANY
McCORD CORPORATION
MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC
OAKFABCO
J UTAH POWER AND LIGHT CO.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Rick L. Rose Rrose(2)jq acorn
Gregory Roberts groberts(afrqn.corn
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

AQUA-CHEM, INC. (Cleaver-Brooks, a
1 division of)

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Melinda A. Morgan Mam@xbmn.com
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CONGOLEUM CORPORATION
R V. ROBERTS & ASSOCIATES, INC.
FLOWSERVE CORPORATION
HAMILTON MATERIALS, INC,
OSRAM S YLVANIA INC
OWENS-ILLINOIS INC.
PENNZOIL-QUAKER STATE
COMPANY
RAYPAK, INC.
VIAD CORPORATION
LEAR-SIEGLER DIVERSIFIED
1 HOLDINGS CORPORATION
ARVINMERITOR, INC. (Successor to
Meritor Automotive, Inc.)
MERITOR AUTOMOTIVE GROUP
BOEING NORTH AMERICAN INC.
(Successor to The Boeing Copany)
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION
HANSON PERMANWNTE CEMENT,
INC

Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
531-2000

TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE & HUTCHINSON
Steven F. Hutchinson Shutchinson@tavloradams.com
Su J. Chon Schon@tayJoradams.com
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah S4106-2843
Telephone: (801) 486-1112
Facsimile: (801)486-1198
SNELL & WflLMER LLP
Tracy Fowler tfowleitSswlaw.com
Kamie F. Brown kbrown@swlaw.com
15 West South Temple Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
SHEA & GARDNER
David Booth Beers
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 828-2000
Facsimile. (202) 828-2195
Rglazer@sheagardner.com

B J . GOODRICH
FULTON BOILER WORKS, INC.
JOHN CRANE CO.
SIX STATES DISTRIBUTORS, INC.

BABCOCKBORSIG POWER Oca.
RILEY STOKER CORPORATION
D.B. Riley f.k.a, Riley Stoker Corporation

DUNN&DUNN
Robert C. Morton rmoiton@dunndunn.com
Susan Black Dunn sblack@dunndunn.com
230 South 500 East, Suite 460
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-6677
Facsimile: (801) 521-9998
SUITIERAXLAND
Michael W. Homer Mliomer@suitter.com
Bret S. Hayman Bhavman@suitter.com
175 South West Temple Suite 700
1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
(801) 532-7300 Telephone
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(801) 532-7355 Facsimile
BASF CORPORATION
BECHTEL CORPORATION (DE)
DEL MONTE
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
GENUINE PARTS COMPANY
KOHLER COMPANY
NISSAN
PARKER BOILER COMPANY
PFIZER
QUIGLEY COMPANY, INC.
ROLLS-ROYCE PLC
SEQUOIA VENTURES, INC
STUART-WESTERN, INC.
SUPRO CORPORATION
TARKETT, INC.
[ THERMAL WEST INDUSTRIAL
BURNS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
CORPORATIONffk/WBORG-WARNER
AUTOMOTIVE

BRADSHAW AUTO PARTS OF SUGARHOUSE
CAPCO PIPE COMPANY
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION
DEXTER CORPORATION
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
HANSON PERMANENTE CEMENT, INC,
KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY
VIACOM, INC
THE FLINTKOTE COMPANY
INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE
CORPORATION
J UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES, INC
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC

j

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
John R. Lund Asbestos@scmlaw.com
10 Exchange Place Suite 1100
P.O. Box 45000
SaltLake City, Utah 84145
(801)521-9000

•
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Dennis Ferguson Dferguson/ahvilliunt.com
257 East 250 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Facsimile: (801) 364-4500
SNELL & WEJMER LLP
Bryon J. Benevento Bbenevento@swlaw.com
James D. Gardner Jdgardner@swlaw.com
David N. Wolf Dwolf@swlaw.com
Kamie F. Brown Kbrown@swlaw.com
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004

BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY
Jeffery S. Williams Jsw@bcpclaw.com
Sean N. Egan
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
[(801)533-8383
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BURTON LUMBER

CARLISLE CORPORATION
CRANE CO.
EIMCO
HOBART BROTHERS COMPANY
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION
MILLER ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING CO.
SIOUX TOOLS, INCL.
INTERNATIONAL CELLULOSE
CORPORATION

Robert A. Burton bobb@burtonIumber.com
PX).Box65717
Salt Lake City, Utah 84165-0717
(801)487-8861Telephone
(801) 487-5815 Facsimile

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Elizabeth S. Conley Econley(2bblutah.com
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street Suite 1800
P.O Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
(801) 532-1234 Telephone
(801) 536-6111 Facsimile
THELEN REID & PRIEST, LLP
101 Second Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, California 94105-3601
(415) 371-1200 Telephone
Send pleadings, etc^ by fax to: (415) 371-1211

CSK AUTO, INC.
CUTLER-HAMMER, INC.
D. CUMMINS CORPORATION
EATON CORPORATION
RAILROAD FRICTION PRODUCTS
CORPORATION
WABASH POWER EQUIPMENT CO.

Barbara L. Maw bmaw@fre700.com
Bruce C. Burt bruce buit@fre700.coni
185 South State Street, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Fax 533-8111

EXXON MOBILE CORPORATION
FLYING J, INC

LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MacRAE, LLP.
James K. Tracy Jtracy(S),llgni.com
1000 Keams Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)320-6700

FDCC CALIFORNIA, INC.

KIRTON & McCONKIE
Lynn C. McMurray lmcmurrav@kmclaw.com

FREIGHTLINER CORP.
FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORPORATION

PLANT WALLACE CEffilSTENSEN & KANELL
Mark J. Williams Mwilliams(S),pwcklaw.com
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Sab Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-7611
Facsimile: 531-9747
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HAFERS, INC.
PAGE BAKE COMPANY INCORPORATED

BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE
Brinton Burbidge bburbidge@bcowlaw.com
Paul D. Van Komen Pvankomen@bcowlaw.corQ
50 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: 359-7000
Facsimile: 236-5319

INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY COMPANY

MORGAN, MINNOCK & RICE
Joseph E. Minnock Jminnock@lawmmr. com
136 South Main Street, 8m Floor
SaltLakeCity, Utah 84101
Telephone: 531-7888
Facsimile: 531-9732

j

JOHN DEERE INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
COMPANY

CALLISTER, NEBEKER& MCCULLOUGH
Martin R. Denney mrdenny@cnmlaw.com

j

KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL
CORPORATION

HOLLAND & HART LLP
Reha Deal Rdeal@hollandhart.com
Brent Johnson B johnson@hollaQdhart.com

1

KENNECOTT UTAH CORPORATION
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
FTBERITE, INC

LENNOX INDUSTRIES, INC.
CHEVRON PRODUCTS COMPANY
DOW CHEMICAL
GENERAL ELECTRIC
BAYER CROPSCIENCE USA, INC

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL
David B. Watkiss watkissb@ballardspahr.com
James E. Magleby maglebvi@ballardspahr.com
Paxton R. Guymon guymorip@ballardspahr.com
Craig H Howe howe@ballardspahrxom
201 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT $4111-2221
Telephone: (801)531-3000
Facsimile: (801)531-3001
KIPP& CHRISTIAN
Gregory L Sanders Gisanders@jkjppandchristian com
10 Exchange Place, 4* Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
Facsimile: (801) 359-9004
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LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE PRAXAIR (Praxair Distribution, Inc.)
HOBART BROTHERS CORPORATION

MOUNTAIN STATES INSULATION SUPPLY

NORTH AMERICAN REFRACTORIES
COMPANY
LAKELAND INDUSmiES INC.
AUTOZONE, INC.

1 PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
; Elizabeth S. Coniey econley@pblutah.com
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111
CROSBY, HEAFEY, ROACH & MAY
Albert B, Norris
Professional Corporation
Two Embarcadero Center Suite 2000
San Francisco CA 94111
Telephone (415) 543-8700
Facsimile (415) 659-5695

j

JOHN M. SHARP
371 East 25* Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (801) 522-7122

]

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK Sc McDONOUGH
Ross I. Romero Rromero@ioneswaldo.com
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
521-3200
MARKUSSON GREEN & JARVIS
Dennis H. Markusson Markusson@mgj law.com
William B. Stanton Stanton@ineilaw.com
999 18* Street, Suite 3300
Denver. CO 80202
(303)572-4200

PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION
SACOMO MANUFACTURING COMPANY
SACOMO SIERRA, INC.
STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, INC.

1 Barbara K. Berrett Bberrett@,bent&petty.com
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C.
50 S. Main Street #530
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Telephone: (801)531-7733
Facsimile: (801)531-7711
Nwright@berrettpetty.com (Please send to Nedra too)
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METALCLAD
PARSONS ENERGY <fc CHEMICAL GROUP,
INC.
NATIONWIDE BOILER, INC.

SACK, MILLER & ROSENDIN, LLP
Joanne Rosendin ir@smrlaw.com
One Kaiser Plaza, Suite 340
Oakland, CA
Telephone (510) 286-2200
Facsimile (510) 286-8887
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
Dale 1 Lambert Asbestos.Groups@chrisien.com
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472

PINNACLE ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.

ROCKWELL D. SHUTJER
4244 South Rowland Drive
Salt Lkae Ciyt, Utah 84124

PLAINTIFFS

BRAYTON PURCELL
Robert G. Gilchrist
S. Brook Millard
215 So State Street, Ste 900
Salt Lake City, Utah S4111
rgilchrist@bravtonlaw.com
mmillard@braytonlaw.com
sparduhnfalbraytonlaw .com

RAPID AMERICAN CORPORATION

MCCONNELL SCDERIUS FLEISCHNER
HOUGHTALING & CRAIGMILE
James M. Miletich jmiletich@msflic.com
2401 - 15th Street, Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
Phone: (303)458-9545
Todd S. Winegar ToddWinegar@azbar.org
201 South Main Street, Suite 900
P.O. Box 353
| Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
! Telephone: (801) 364-9995
1
Facsimile: (801) 533-2626

SCANDURA,INC.

SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD
Reynold M. Martinez rervrooldmartmez@sdma.com
One Embarcadero Center, 16th Floor
San Francisco, California 94111-3628
(415)731-7900 Telephone
(415) 781-2635 Facsimile
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UNITED STATES WELDING

MACKE Y, PRICE & WILLIAMS
Gifford W. Price
57 West 200 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 575-5000

|

UTAH AUTO PARTS

DURHAM JOENS & PINEGAR
Bryan J. Pattison bpatti son@diplaw.com
Michael F. Leavitt mleavitt @djpiawxom

WATERMAN STEAM CORPORATION
MARINE TRANSPORT LINES, INC.
DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC.
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
CENTRAL GULF LINES, INC.

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Ross I. Romero Rromero@ioDeswaldo.com
1500 Wells Faigo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
521-3200
THOMPSON HINE LLP
Richard C Bin2ieydick.binzlev@thompsonhiDe.c0m
3900 Key Center
127 Public Square
Cleveland, OH 44114-1291
Telephone: 216-566-5500
Fax:216-566-5800

WESTERN READY MIX CONCRETE CORP.

E. H. FANKHAUSER
243 East 400 South Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

WE YERHAUSER CORPORATION

EMARD DANOFF PORT & TAMULSKI
Andrew I. Port aport@edptlaw.com
49 Stevenson Street, Suite 400
San Francisco CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 227-9455
Facsimile: (415) 227-4255

WHEELER MACHINERY COMPANY

J
J

KESLER& RUST
Scott O. Mercer SOM@kesler-nist.com
36 South State, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-8000
Facsimile: 531-7965
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